Intersections
Volume 2004 | Number 19

2004

The Ought
Ned Wisnefske

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.augustana.edu/intersections
Augustana Digital Commons Citation
Wisnefske, Ned (2004) "The Ought," Intersections: Vol. 2004: No. 19, Article 7.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.augustana.edu/intersections/vol2004/iss19/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Augustana Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Intersections by an
authorized administrator of Augustana Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@augustana.edu.

Article 7

The Ought
Ned Wisnefske

Nobody likes the Ought. Everyone tries to flee from the
Ought whenever it comes around, or even deny it exists.

encounters us?) Once more, when the Ought starts to
enter, we close the classroom door.

Moral education is all about the Ought: we ought to do
this; we ought not to do that. There is opposition to
moral education in college, from students as well as
faculty, because not even they want to hear this or be
around the Ought. Some say (with respects to Dr. Seuss),
"You cannot teach morals to college students because it
is too late. They have already been formed by family,
school, church, and state." Or else you hear, "You
cannot teach values to college students because that
would mold them. You must only expose them, not
compose them."

This fear and denial of the Ought tells us something
important about ourselves. For one, the fact that we feel
threatened shows that we sense the presence of the
Ought. How else do we explain our contradictory
objections to the moral formation of students, or why we
protest so zealously against it? If the Ought were really
nothing, we would simply ignore it, as we would the
claim that there is a ghost in the room. We feel
threatened because we realize that the Ought intends to
shape us. That is why we flee from it and even deny it
exists. Evidently we have the mind, heart, and will to
sense the Ought, to respond to it, and to be shaped by it,
yet we do not want to use those capacities. Finally, what
does it say about us that we realize something exists, yet
refuse to respond to it and even deny it? It says that there
is something obstinate about our moral nature. This
entrenched stubbornness, whatever it is, prevents us from
seeing moral demand before our eyes, and obstructs
moral education.

Now note something about these two very common
claims: they make opposite assumptions.
The first
complaint assumes that students are already formed (and
can no longer be shaped morally), whereas the second
charge assumes that students are not formed (and should
shape themselves). Curiously, you hear both objections
out of the same mouth in the same conversation: "You
cannot teach morals because students' morals are already
formed." "You cannot teach morals because you will
form students' morals." Both cannot be true.

How might we overcome this obstinacy? Can we get the
Ought in the classroom without causing students and
faculty to flee? As we have seen, we refuse to see the
Ought in front of us; but we might sense it behind us,
nudging us. Perhaps there we can hear its presence and
not close our ears, feel its breath and its clasp on our
shoulders and not cover up.

Why do we hear these contradictory objections to moral
formation? The answer is that both share the same fear,
the fear of the Ought. As is often the case, opposites are
joined by a common threat. In this case, both feel
threatened by the demands posed by the Ought. They
feel threatened because the Ought intends to shape them
in ways they do not want. So when students meet moral
demands in the classroom and feel the presence of the
Ought they will say, "The Ought cannot be real. Since
our upbringings are so diverse, and we see things so
differently, the Ought has to be something different for
each us." In this way they convince themselves that the
Ought is not actually there in the classroom with them at
all, but only their personal, pet oughts-which is not the
real animal. Or, when some faculty find out that the
Ought has been allowed into the classroom, they
complain, "The Ought must leave. There must only be
oughts in the room. Only those oughts are allowed which
we choose to be oughts." In so professing they too
banish the Ought, since an ought we choose is really not
the Ought at all. (A clever way to deny the Ought
while appearing to acknowledge it-is to allow that we
each already have oughts we bring with us, so why
concern ourselves with the Ought which supposedly

It might work this way. Let students and faculty begin by
supposing that there really could be an Ought. (Isn't it
possible that moral demand encounters us and is not
invented by us? That the difference between right and
wrong is objective and not subjective?) Then, let us see
whether we might find out what the Ought is, if together
we search for it by using our moral capacities: examining
our moral senses, applying the rules common to us, and
weighing our moral judgments, discerning the better ones
from the worse.
When we do that we may not find the Ought, though it
will find us; for then we will realize that the persons
participating in this enterprise deserve respect. To
exercise our capacities to be impartial, to sympathize, and
to exert our free will gives us distinction and sets us apart
as beings with dignity. To realize this is to be grasped by
the claim that humans should and should not be treated in
certain ways. When that happens the Ought has entered
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to think clearly, our hearts to feel genuinely, and our
wills to act rightly. The Ought can reform the formations
of our past, and transform our wants to give purpose to
our future.

the room and nudged us. Then we can no longer deny it,
and we will realize that we need not fear it, though we
might be awed by it.
This might seem like a small thing, a naught rather than
the Ought, but in that little thing is contained most
everything. For it is the Ought which shapes our minds

It is never, therefore, too late, or a mistake, to be shaped
by the Ought.
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